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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
INEKE SLUITER AND RALPH ROSEN
i. Introduction
Just weeks before the Start of the second Penn-Leiden Colloquium on
Ancient Values, on the topic of Free Speech in Classical Antiquity the
unconventional Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was murdered—a polit-
ical crimc that no Dutch citizen would have believed possible in the
Netherlands. At the time, it was almost automatically assumed that the
motive for the murder was to be sought in Fortuyn's outspokenness on
topics long considered off-limits by more politically correct representa-
tives of 'Dutch tolerance'. His killer, on the other hand, after his arrest
persisted in a consciously chosen strategy of total silence: the Opposi-
tion betwcen his exercise of the right to remain silent and the ultimate
denial of the right of free speech in another was striking.
At the same time, in the United States the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia was reconsidcring whether cross-burning should be protected
under the First Amendment, in a reexamination of the arguments
made in the classic R.A.V case on the same topic.1 This case has occu-
pied not only legal scholars, but also philosophers and linguists. People
are entitled to their communicative symbols, so one argument goes, but
what exactly does this particular symbol translate into? Does the burn-
ing cross in the yard of an African American family indeed signify a
1
 R.A.V are the iniüals of the white juvenile who had been arrested for burning a
cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. He was charged with violating St. Paul's
Bias-Motivaled Crime Ordinancc, which prohibited the placement of any symbol on
public or private party that aroused anger in others on the basis of race, color, crced,
rcligion, or gender. The trial court dismissed this Charge on the grounds that it was
overbroad and impermissibly content-based undcr the First Amendment. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court reversed, Holding that the ordinance prohibited only 'fighting
words', which werc not protected under the First Amcndmenl. Bul the US Supreme
Court helcl that the St. Paul ordinance was indeed invalid under the First Amendment.
For a description of this case, see Matsuda et al. 1993, 133 ff That volume contains
a fascinating scrics of papers on 'hatc speech', viewed from the perspective of critical
race theory. On the R.A.V. case, see in parlicular also Butler 1997, 52ff; the connection
bctween this case and ancient idcas on free speech was also made in Sluiter 2000.
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Statement of opinion or does it represent, not speech, but aggressive
behavior, standing in for an outright attack? In the Former case, it could
claim First-Amendment protection, in the latter not. And what if it is a
form of speech? What then is its correct translation? An opinion of the
form Ί think you should not be living here'? In that case it could again
claim First-Amcndment protection. The opinion is offensive, but it can
be combated in a free exchange of ideas. On the other hand, it is not
hard to argue that the burning cross is more accurately translated into a
racist threat. The distinction between words and acts on which the first
Amendment is premised ('äs long äs we are talking, we're not shoot-
ing') is crucial in this case—but is it a valid one? Freedom of speech is
not only a value that, like other societal values, is creatcd through the
use of language: in this case, the value is also about language, and one's
view of language and the way it works may influence one's views on
First-Amendment protection.
One way to look at the problcm of frcedom of speech, for instance, is
through an application of the theory of the performative.2 Linguists and
philosophers have long been convinced that words and deeds are not
necessarily essentially different. Words always 'do' things, like ordering
or asking (this is thcir illocutionary force), some words (performatives)
do what they say e.g. when saying Ί promise', I have made a promise;
however, in this case the performative is illocutionary, its action takes
place within the confines of language. Other words presuppose that
they are capable of having a direct effect in the world out there, e.g.
when I have 'persuaded' you, you have undergone a change through
my use of language only ('perlocutionary performatives').
So in the light of these ideas on how language works, one might
rephrase the problem of the R. A. V case: is the Statement allegedly con-
tained in the burning-cross symbol an intra-linguistic dcvice, a so-callcd
'illocutionary performative'? Then it remains within the framework of
language and deserves First-Amcndment protection. However, might it
not bc considered a perlocutionary performative, a speech-act directly
affecting its addressee? Hate speech may have definite perlocutionary
effects, it seems, it is like getting hit, and produces the effect of physical
paralysis.'5 If the burning cross was considered a perlocutionary perfor-
2
 See Austin 1979 and 1975; Searlc 1969; for application to this case, sec Butler 1997;
Sluiter 2000.
"' Lawrence, in Matsuda et al. 1993, 68; Butler 1997, 4. Gf. in a different (and much
more benevolent) setting, Pl. Meno 8oa f., sce below section 3.
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mativc, it might not be granted First-Amcndment protection—if the
judges werc willing to consider these views on languagc, which so far
they have not been.'1
In the Western world, the value of frccdom of speech is generally
belicvcd to first emerge within the Greek world—it will be a point of
debate in this book whether we are actually correct in thinking so, or
whether a distinction needs to be made between our notions of 'frce-
doms', including freedom of speech, and a notion of Tree speech'.
However that may be, frce speech in classical Antiquity will be at the
center of attention in this volume. After having explored the value of
ανδρεία 'manliness', 'courage', in the first volume that came out of the
Penn-Leiden Colloquia on Ancicnt Values (Rosen and Sluiter 2003),
this second volume will concern itself with a set of issucs that does not
focus primarily on the construction of personal identity or communal
group identity, but that will center on represcntations of power rela-
tionships, real or perceivcd, within society at large or smaller group for-
mations, and on political ideology. These power relationships underlie
the different practices of frec speech, literary, social, military, philosoph-
ical or political. They are also important in ancient theoretical reflcc-
tion on the topic of frec speech. Just like andreia 'manliness', 'courage',
'frec speech' is a concept that is constructed through language, and
that lends itself to various kinds of rhetorical manipulation. In addition,
however, free speech is also a concept that concerns language itself, that is
somehow about languagc, and its societal functions, and this is an issue
that we will briefly address in this introduction.
In keeping with our principle of firmly basing our investigations on
the ancient lexicon, and only thcn extrapolating to wider-reaching con-
clusions, this is a book about παρρησία on the Greek side, and (mostly)
libertas and licentia on the Roman sidc. This chaptcr will briefly intro-
duce the semantics of παρρησία (section 2), then discuss the relation-
ship between free speech and other contemporary views on language
On formulating criteria for First-Amendment proleclion, sec e.g. Malsuda 1993,
. Butler 1997, 39 points out that only a perlocutionary Interpretation of a speech-
act (i.e. one that assumes a certain direct eifert on the hearcr) will identify speech and
behavior to such an extent that legal action might be possible. As long äs the speech act
'acts' in an illocutionary way only, i.e. within the framework that has been crealed by
speech itself, First-Amcndment protection will remain in force. Butler herseif is of the
opinion that the solution for 'hate speech' is not to be sought in legal regulation, but in
the self-regulating polenlial oflanguage, which is capable of creating ncw interprelativc
frameworks for evcn the most offensive utterances,.
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(particularly on rhetoric) in Antiquity (scction 3). In section 4, wc will
briefly address the repression of free speech and the major diffcrences
that became obvious during the Conference betwecn Greek and Roman
attitudes toward frcc speech. Section 5 gives a previcw of the different
contributions.
2. The semantics offree speech^
In contradistinction to andreia, which is invariably held to be a good
thing (evcn when somebody perverscly applies it to something which
rcally is bad), and which is gcnerally articulatcd äs a value, virtue,
and norm, parrhesia may in and of itself be used äs a simple descriptor,
e.g. of a practice commonly associated with democracy, which may be
evaluated äs either a good or a bad thing depending on the vicws of
the Speaker. Given the frequent occurrencc of the term in authors who
endorse democratic political practice (e.g. Euripides, Demosthenes), its
evaluation tends to be positive more often than negative in our fifth-
and fourth-century sources. Howevcr, a first occurrence in a decidcdly
negative sense is found in Euripides Orestes, in the messenger speech
describing the legal proceedings against Orestes. This is how the mob
orator who will carry the day is describcd (gosff.):6
Then there stood up
a man with no check on his tonguc, strong in bis brashness
He was an Argive, but no Argive, suborned,
Relying on noise from the crowd and the obtusc license of his tongue,
Persuasive enough to involve them in the future in some misfortune.
(tr. Kovacs)
5
 We thank Michiel Cock for collecting most of these dala on ihe semantics of
παρρησία. In all passages cited below, the actual term παρρησία occurs in ihe same
context äs the words actually quotcd. The concept of pmihesm is discussed by Radin
1927; Peterson 1929; Schlier 1954; Scarpat 1964 (who also pays attention to the Latin
terminology); Bartelink 1970; Raailaub 1980 ancl 1985; Sluiter 2000; Foucault 2001
(thcse are the famous 1983 Icctures). This section will concentrate on παρρησία We
will not go into the semantics of εξουσία (ποιητική) here (e.g. D.H., CV 19; Strabo
1.2.17), or on the Latin terms Liberias (for which see Scarpat 1964), luentw (o.g., äs
Open speech' Rhet. ad Her. 4.36.48-50; Quint. 9.2.27-28; äs 'poetic licence', Hör. AP
46-59), oratio hbera (e.g. Quint. 9.2.27-28) and mreluenlia (Carmen dejiguns vel sihemalibus
130). These concepts will be discussed by Raaflaub, Chrissanthos, and Braund in this
volume. Nor is this the place to discuss (e.g. Stoic) notions of 'calling a spade a spaclc'
(εύθυρρημοσύνη), although this is also associaled with παρρησία (sce below).
(>
 The vcrsc in which ihe actual word παρρησία occurs is generally held to be an
GENERAL INTRODUGTION 5
κάπΐ τψδ' άνίσταται
Άνήρ τις άθυρόγλωσσος, ισχύων θράσει·
Άργεϊος ουκ Άργεΐος, ήναγκασμένος,
θορυβώ τε πίσυνος κάμαθεΐ παρρησίαι,
πιθανός έΥ αύτοϋς περιβαλεΐν κακώι τινι.
The negative impression left by παρρησία is due at least in part to
the explicit adjective άμαθεϊ, but by this point of the dcscription it
is unlikcly that cven παρρησία by itself would have been interpreted
positivcly. The man has already been described in terms that remind
one of Thersites.7 The mob orator is, moreover, opposed to the ncxt
Speaker in the mccting, who is called courageous (andreios, E. Or. 918—
contrast thrasei in vs. 903), and is described äs someone who works the
land with his own hands (autourgos, 920), but at the same time is smart
about argumcnts (vs. 921).
Negative evaluations of parrhesia are also found in Plato and in Isoc-
ratcs, not only in connection with its political use (e.g. in the familiär
passagc from the Areopagiticus, Isoc. 7.20), but also e.g. in a personal
social setting, äs whcn the 'lovcr' in Plato's Phaedrus is described äs
importuning his ewmenos with inappropriatc praise and insufferable
reproaches: when the lover also happcns to be drunk, his words are not
just insufferable but also embarrassing, since the lover avails himself of
a 'wearisome and unrestrained explicit speech' παρρησία κατακορεϊ και
άναπεπταμένη, (PL Phdr. 24066)—once more the negative connotation
is cnforced, and maybe even produccd, by the addition of overtly
negative adjectives—a procedurc that is in itself fitting for the vox
media constituted by παρρησία. 'Saying all' in itself is not evaluative in
Interpolation, bc it one that is cntirely possible in the context of late fifth-century
tragecly (Willink, ad loc.).
7
 G f. especially the term άθυρόγλωσσος used here with αμετροεπής and άκριτόμυθε
at //. 2.212 and 246. Although in the Iliad, the tetin παρρησία is not used, a lot of
attention is paid to Thersites' relation lo language. In just thrce verscs (//. 2.212-214)
the narrator mcntions this aspcet four times. He is called αμετροεπής, 'not knowing the
right measure in words'; his verbal style is indicated by the verb έκολώα 'he brawled' (//.
2.212), and his most characteristic propcrty ('what he knows in his heart') are his 'many
words that recognize no κόσμος, no natural order' (2.213); moreover, he uses thosc for
brazen and orderless (kosmos, again) fights with kings (2.214). Odysseus agrees with the
narrator. He calls Thersites άκριτόμιυϋε, admits that he is a good Speaker, bul denies
him the right to argue with kings since he is a worthless fellow himself (2.246!!.). On
Thersites, cf. e.g. Rankin 1972.
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a positive or negative scnse." Again, in Isocrates the word παρρησία may
be closely linked with overtly negative phrascs like (Isoc. 16.22): 'thcy
revile with excessive indcccncy and audacity' (λοιδοροϋσι δε λίαν ασελ-
γώς και Φράσεως), or it may be put on an equal footing with κακηγορία.9
In democratic idcology parrhesia is a positive value, and again this
positive evaluation is mostly emphatically reinforced by the context:10
people 'flourish' in their parrhesia.," it is associated with the courageous
expression of one's beliefs, however unpopulär they may be.1- It always
involves frankness,n and the füll disclosure of one's thoughts14—in that
sense it is opposcd to dissimulation, hiding one's real thoughts15 or the
unpleasant truth, or to silence applied äs a discourse stralcgy to get
one's way,16 äs the strategy of a 'moderate politician',17 or äs the despi-
8
 For a discussion of ihe tcrms ελευθέρως λέγειν, Ισηγορία and παρρησία, see Raaf-
laub 1985, 277ff.; cf. Raaflaub 1980, 3iff.; 35.
9
 Isoc. 11.40 (Busiris) περί μεν της προς αλλήλους κακηγορίας ... της δ' είς τους ΰεοϋς
παρρησίας 'libels against each other ... loose-tongued vilification of the gods' (tr. Van
Hook).
10
 Gf. e.g. E. fr. 737 N. καλόν γ' αληθής κάτενής παρρησία, 'truc and carncst pai rhesia
is a good thing'—implying that other varieties are conceivable. Unqualified dcclara-
tions of the fact ihatpanhesia is good, e.g. in Menander's Sententiae (line 60; 623 Jaekel).
11
 πάλλοντες, Ε. Hipp. 422.
u
 See the contributions of Balot and Roisman in this volume, and e.g. PL Lg. 83504.
n
 Gf. Isoc. 2.3 'furthermorc, frcedom of spccch and the privilege which is openly
granted to friends to rebuke and to encmies lo altack each other's faults' (tr. Norlin) (έτι
δ' ή παρρησία και το φανερώς έξεΐναι τοις τε φίλοις έπιπλήξαι και τοις έχΰροΐς έπιθ-έσθαι
ταΐς αλλήλων άμαρτίαις); Ar. EM H24b2g 'to speak and act openly' (λέγειν και πράττειν
φανερώς).
14
 E.g. E. Phoen. 39! 'to say what one thinks' (λέγειν α τις φρονεί); Dem. 4.5' <anc^
today, keeping nothing back, I havc givcn free utterancc to my plain senliments' (tr.
Vmce) (α γιγνώσκω πάνΟ' απλώς, ουδέν ΰποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίασμαι). Noticc that
απλώς itself is also a signal word for the presence of παρρησία.
11
 κρυψίνους, X. Ag. 11.5; forms of αποκρύπτομαι, e.g. Dem. 6.31; Isoc. 12.218 (wherc
this is actually deemed wise).
16
 Παρρησία is the favorite mode of expression öl the Gynic philosophers, yet the
Gynic Demonax shamcs the people into the right kind of behavior by just looking
at them without saying anything, Lucianus Vita Denton. 64. On the Cynics, cf. Sluiter
forthcoming
17
 As m the debate between Dcmosthenes and Aeschines on the right measurc of
participation in public discourse: a middlc course between polupmgmosune (and a clesire
to make money) and a lack of commitment to the public intcrest. Cf. Aesch. In Ctes.
218 την δ' έμήν σιωπήν... ή του βίου μετριότης παρεσκεύασεν; 22ο; Dem. 18.308, which
also cleals with the problem that the general public is of course likely to engage in
ησυχία, so that the Speaker has to be carcful to dissociate behavior that is reproachful
in a politician from the legilimatc behavior of thc Athenian people äs a body. We thank
Tazuko van Berkel for her research on parrhhm and silence.
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cable attitude of someone lacking in political commitment.18 Silence
may of course also be imposed on a party, thus suppressing their access
to frcc speech.19 In parrhesia therc is no holding back, a conccpt often
exprcssed by the verb ύποστέλλομαι, 'to draw back, impose restriclions
on oneself, refrain from saying'.20 It is also linked in an interesting way
with truth: the parrhesiast must necessarily believe in the truth of what
he is saying, or at least in the fact that to the best of his knowledgc
what he is saying is true.21 Since frankncss may also involve a certain
lack of consideration for societal niceties,22 it also becomes associated
with an uncouth manner—this is how we find it äs a form of comic
poneria. 'Calling a spade a spade' is part of the concept of parrhesia.1'' It
is strongly opposed to noüons of 'nattery'.24 And it is disinterested.-"' A
passage that manages to bring together a great many of these aspects of
the semantics of παρρησία is found at the end of Demosthenes' fourth
Philippic oration (10.76):
There you have the truth spoken with all freedom (παρρησία), simply
in goodwill and for the best—no speech packed through flattery with
mischief and deceit, and intended to put moncy into the speaker's pocket
and the control of the State into our cnemies' hands.
(tr. Vince, adapted)
18
 On ησυχία, cf. Balot in Üiis volume.
19
 See Greenwood in this volume.
20
 E.g. PL Ap. 24a; E. Ba. 668; Dem. 4.51; 19.237, Isoc. 9.39.
21
 Cf. e.g. Dem. 11.17 είρήσεται γαρ τάληθή, 'for the truth will bc told'; [Dem.] 60.26
την παρρησίαν εκ της αληθείας ήρτημένην ουκ εστί τάληθές δηλοΰν άποτρε\|)αι, 'it is not
possible to turn away panhesia from making clear the truth, since it depends on the
truth'.
22
 It will not be προς χάριν, e.g. Dem. 3.3; 4.51.
23
 Cf. n. 5 above. The proverb τα σϋκα σϋκα, την σκάφην σκάφην λέγει, ('he calls a fig
a fig and a trough a trough') (Arsenius & Paroemiogr. Apophthegmata, Cent. 15, section
95b, line i; cf. Apostolius, Pmoem.Gr. [Leuisch] 658) is linked with the outspokenness
of fricndship ([Demetr.] De elotuiwne 239), and it is explicilly linked with παρρησία in
Lucian's Quomodo hist. totua. 41, in his description of what it takes to be a good historian:
'That, then, is the sort of man the historian should be: fcarless, incorruptible, free, a
fricnd of free expression and the truth, intent, äs the comic poet says, on calling a fig
a fig and a trough a trough etc.' (tr. Kilburn) (Τοιούτος ούν μοι ό συγγραφεύς έστω·
άφοβος, αδέκαστος, ελεύθερος, παρρησίας και αληθείας φίλος, ως ό κωμικός φησι, τα
σϋκα σϋκα, την σκάφην δε σκάφην όνομάσων). The referencc may be to Aristophanes,
sec CGF (Kock) 451. Wc are grateful to the studenls of the 'free speech' seminar in
Leiden, particularly to Casper de Jonge and Carolien Tricschnigg, for research on this
issue.
24
 E.g. Dem. 9.3.
25
 Isoc. 15.43 ε'1 (·ιεν ουν l·101 συνοίσει κατειπόντι την άλήθειαν, ουκ οίδα.
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Ταϋτ' εστί τάληθή, μετά πάσης παρρησίας, απλώς εύνοια τα βέλτιστ' είρη-
μένα, ου κολακεία βλάβης και απάτης μεστός, άργύριον τω λέγοντι ποιή-
σων, τα δε πράγματα της πόλεως τοις έχθροΐς έγχειριών.
Given that παρρησία is a word that, in and of itself, allows for very
flexible application, and that will always confront us with the qucstion
of 'who gets to speak and what is it they get to say', the rhctoric of
free speech is a particularly fruitful area of study. Power over discourse
is a ccntral feature in any societal equilibrium, and the perception of
its importance and effects is bound up with what one thinks about the
workings of language in general.
3. The linguistics offree speech
Oligarchs and aristocrats havc their own views on free and equal
speech. Howcver, for an Athenian in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE
the concept is especially poignant, and it is no coincidence that the
'Grcek' papers in this volumc mainly concentrate on that pcriod. We
want to argue that dcvelopments in theories of language and political
developments go hand in hand in this respcct, and that the ideology of
language embodied in the concept of παρρησία is somehow related to
views about the functioning of language emcrging in the same period.
The fifth Century, of course, witnesscs the rise of rhetoric, and the decp
conviction that language is an Instrument that can be used to influence
other people. It is a form of behavior that can produce dircct and
momentous effects in the world out thcre—in that sense, the concept
of 'perlocutionary effect' of the speech-act theoreticians was old news.
In Homcric society speaking well is an essential skill for kings and
leadcrs, and one that commoners can and should do without. One of
the interesting effects of the radical political changes in the fifth Century
is that ever larger groups rcquire such skills in more and more contexts
(c.g. legal and political). It Stands to rcason that these are favorable
circumstanccs for studying the persuasive effects of language, and such
study will yield a more systematic insight into rhetorical techniqucs,
which in turn will make it all the more desirablc that the Instrument
of language be available to all on any given topic. Rhetoric is in part
the result of democratic practicc, and increases in turn the irnportancc
of free speech—for it is free speech which guarantecs access to the
powerful Instrument of language.
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There are good reasons to assume that particularly efficacious lan-
guage had long bcen the province of pocts, seers, and kings pronounc-
ing judgment to cxpress their special insight into the truth. Public
speaking was, at least theoretically, the privilege of this small and select
group.26 And whereas early philosophers took a particular interest in
language äs the key to truth and reality, the conception of language äs
a tool, something to be used to persuade peoplc, was the special con-
tribution of the later fifth- Century sophists. Wc will concentrate herc in
particular on the ideas of Gorgias, who made an overwhelming Impres-
sion on the Athenians when he first visited their city in 427 BCE.27
Gorgias held the view that language and reality are incommensu-
rablc cntities: when talking about a color, the means of communication
is essentially different from the nature of the thing communicated—in
that sense, real or dircct communication through language is impossi-
ble, since language will always involve crcating a Version' of reality.28
What one does in talking, is to influence the opinions of the audience
with one's own version of reality, a representation which will always
contain a form of deccit (άπατη). Language will not allow one to trans-
fer knowledge, but eloquence will persuade pcople, and persuasion
(πειθώ) is the purpose of eloquence.
In his Fraise of Heien, Gorgias defends the reputation of the woman
for whom people had gone to war. There are, he says, only four
possible reasons for her to have followcd the Trojan Paris: because
of a decision of the gods, i.e. necessity; because she was forced by
violence; because she had been persuaded by the powcr of the word;
or because of Love (of coursc). The striking point is that under none of
these circumstances is she to bc blamed. Yet, how is it possible that if
one allows oneself to bc persuaded by words, one is not responsible for
the ensuing action? That is because the Logos is a powerful master,29
causing violent emotional reactions in the audience. It is a drug, a
psychagogic mcdium,iü and since one's psyche is somatic, it produces
Ä
 Cf. Detienne 1967; Sluiter 1997,
11
 In the hght of Gorgias' own views on language (for which sce below), it is
interesting to nole that Diodorus Siculus, who reports the visit, uses the word εξέπληξε
for this eifert (D.S 12.53).
28
 Gf. Scgal 1962, 109f.
29
 Enc. Hei 8
m
 Επί. Hei. lob = 14: Just like some phmmakm end illness, and others end life, 'so
loo some speeches cause soirow, some cause pleasuic, some cause fear, some give
the hearcrs confidencc, some drug and bewitch the mind with an evü persuasion' (tr.
MacDowell) (ούτω και των λόγων οι μεν έλύπησαν, οι δε έτερψαν, οι δε έφόβησαν, οί δε
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a 'bodily effect'—the perlocutionary Force of language could hardly be
exprcssed more clearly.51
A glimpse of this Gorgianic vision on language is also seen in Plato's
Meno. There, thc character Meno describes in similar terms thc effect
of total paralysis that Socratcs' qucstioning produces in him (PL Meno
Boa f.):
And now you are casting your spells ovcr me, and I am simply gctting
bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture
to makc a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in
your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies
those who come near him with the touch, äs you have now torpified me,
I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know
how to answer you. (tr. Jowett)
και νυν, ως γέ μοι δοκεΐς, γοητεύεις με και φαρμάττεις και άτεχνώς κατεπά-
δεις, ώστε μεστόν απορίας γεγονέναι. και δοκεΐς μοι παντελώς, ει δει τι και
σκώψαι, ομοιότατος είναι το τ' είδος και τάλλα ταύτη τη πλατεία νάρκη τη
θαλαττία· και γαρ αυτή τον αεί πλησιάζοντα και άπτόμενον ναρκαν ποιεί,
και συ δοκεΐς μοι νυν έμέ τοιούτον τι πεποιηκέναι, [ναρκαν] · αληθώς γαρ
έ'γωγε και την ψυχήν και το στόμα ναρκώ, και ουκ έχω δτι άποκρίνωμαί
σοι.
The effect of Socrates' words is dircct and physical, and Meno is pow-
erless to defend himself against it—this is again an ancient description
of the perlocutionary force of words.
It is this Gorgianic vision of language äs an incapacitating drug,
whose victims cannot be held responsible for their bchavior, that seems
to be underlying one of the most alarming tendencies of the Athenian
Assembly. If a decision gets to be regrctted or leads to calamitous
results, the Assembly will not accept responsibility for it, but turns
around and blamcs, charges, and condemns the proposer of the now
reviled motion. And the grounds for doing so is that surely the Speaker
has deceivcd the Assembly (απατή).'" Only with hindsight can one
εις θόρσος κατέστησαν τους άκούοντας, οί δε πειθοΐ τινι, κακή την ψυχήν έξεφαρμάκευσαν
και έγοήτευσαν).
31
 Cf. Segal 1962, 104.11 Physical effects are, e.g. a shiver of fcar, or thc tears that
accompany feelings of pity, Ew. Hei. 9. According to Plalo, too, Gorgias puts peitko in
the soul, i.e. it is a physical addition to the soul, Pl. Grg. 4526. Cf.also Segal 1962, 133.
32
 The best-known example is probably the trial of the generals aftcr thc baltle al the
Arginusae and its sequel. After the generals had been tricd and condemned to death in
an unlawful way, the Alhcmans came lo regret this procedure, and they decidecl to sue
the oncs 'who had deceived the people" (έξηπάτησαν, X. Hell. 1.7.35). The terminology
of απατή is Standard in thesc cascs. In Gorgias, the term is used in a more spccific
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establish whether a Speaker was a courageous parrhesiast, who urged his
honest conviction on the Assembly, or a deceiver, who used his words
äs dangerous weapons of pcrsuasion to lure the people into permcious
action." It takes a certain view on how language works to justify these
side-effects of the idcology of parrhesia And the newly dcveloped ideas
on rhetoric provide the theoretical background to it.M
4. Suppresswn of Speech and strategies of arcumvention
In wnting and thinking about frec speech, one is inevitably also deal-
mg with its repression—and that history, too, Starts in classical Antiq-
uity, both in the political and the artistic realm. In the Iliad (2.212ff.),
Odysscus silences the subversive dissident Thersites, and in the Odyssey
(i.374ff) a first attempt to suppress an artistic voice, and hence to excr-
cise literary censorship, is prevented when Telemachus teils his mothcr
that she cannot stop the bard Phemius from smging about the home-
commg of the Achaeans, even it the topic makes her sad.
Stesichorus' pahnodia givcs us the paradigmatic cxample of an author
recanting, eating his own words, a first in a series of cxamples of autho-
nal sclf-criticism studicd in dcpth in a recent book by Obermeier.iJ
way lo rcfcr to the mability of language to comcide with leality Those are nuanccs
that get lost in the widei usc of the term See fuithcr Hesk 2000 On the risks of
political leadership, cf Smclan 1988, 138-161, particularly 1988, I52ff on the 'general
principle of peisonal responsibihty for public acts', and 1988, 160 with n 118 on the
notion of'misleading' And cf Balot m this volume, on e g Dem 10 75 clealmg with the
revisability of dccisions
3i
 See e g Lys 20 20 Toi even when one of our citizcns here persuades you with
mischievous advice, it is not you who are to blame, but your deceiver' (tr Lamb) (οΰόε
γαρ cl τις των ένθαδε μη τα άριστα λέγων πείθει ϋμας, ούχ ΰμεΐς ίστε αίτιοι, αλλ' ό
έξαπατών υμάς)
n
 See also Schloemann 2002, esp 144 on the cffects of the emergence of rhetoric
with its use of writmg m the democratic audience's percepüon of the lolc of wnting
in the public sphere Schloemann's book on 'Fiele Rede' had not come out when this
manuscript was fimshcd
31
 Obermeier 1999, 20 disünguishes three main categones (a) apologies to pagan
deities or to God, with 'the authoi expiessmg a scnse of havmgjeopaidized Ins spintual
well-being', (b) literary apologies to earthly audienccs, mostly öl women, repentmg
of carlier misogymstic attiludes, (c) apologies for vaiymg literary offenses directed to
a more geneial audience In the Greco-Roman contcxt, authors apologize mostly to
divinities or women, 'pnmanly in post-tulpam attempts to allcviate or avert pumshment'
Obermeier 1999, 43, cf 21 Where women are involved, the apologies are moslly
ironical Cl also Gau ns 1978
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One can draw a virtually unintcrrupted linc bctween Stcsichorus and
the effects of censorship in the Rcpublic of South Africa betwccn the
early igöos and about 1980, äs dcscribcd by Coetzee in his 1996 book
Gimng Offense. The very existence of the officc of, not 'censorship', but
'publications contral',ib 'by forcing the writer to see what he has written
through the censor's cyes ... forces him to internalizc a contaminating
reading'." The samc mechanisms of censorship may be observed in c.g.
China and the former Soviet Union.
Throughout history attempts have been made to suppress, curb, or
destroy frec spcech, and time and again, classical Antiquity is where wc
havc to look first—ironically the samc place where we look for the birth
of the concept of free speech. Book-burning and other forms of book-
destruction in antiquity, for example, are studied at exhaustive classi-
ficatory length in Speyer 198i.i8 Dcstructive activitics directcd against
books includc 'Verbergen, Verbrennen, ins Wasser werfen, Zerschlagen
von Ton- oder Bronzetafeln, Zerreissen von Papyrus oder Pergament'.3q
Howcver, the existence of repression itself may have counterintuitive
and paradoxical effects: on the one hand, it may enhancc interest in
a given text in the gcneral public,"1" a phenomcnon witnesscd again in
our time, e.g. in the case of Salman Rushdie. In fact, it may incite this
interest even if the intrinsic quality of the text does not warrant it.H On
the othcr hand, it may also stimulate the creativity of authors to find
ways to cscape dctection, yet not so effectively that a knowing audicnce
will themselves fail to apprehend their (veiled) meaning. Again, there is
an example in myth in the violent imposition of silence on Philomcla
by Tereus, and her inspired used of embroidcry to teil her story even
without a tongue. Although the phenomcnon of veiled speech is cspe-
i()
 Coelzee 1996, 34. The ratio oi rensors to wnters was higher than ten to one.
37
 Coetzee 1996, 36
58
 On book burning, see also Peasc 1946. He explains the choice to burn books from
the fact that (a) it is definitive; (b) it is suitable to makc a public display out of it; (c) it
exploits the punfying power of nre, (d) it produccs a sympathetic magic effect, m that
the books stand in for the author (1946, 158f, cf. Speyer 1981, 30).
w
 Speyer 1981, 25ff Ray Bradbury's 1953 novel Falnenheil 451 has the ultimate theory
of book-burning· it is the final solution to the cumbersome fact thal therc will always
be somebody, some minority or intcrcst-group, that takes offense ovcr any given book
Better to burn the lot.
10
 Cf Pease 1946, 159.
41
 Cf. Speyer 1981, 68 with n. 144 citmg Tac. Arm. 1450.2 'the books were sought
afler and frequently rcad äs long äs it was dangerous to get a hold of thcm; but soon,
the fact that it was pcrmittecl to have them caused them to bc forgottcn' (conquuitos
lectitalosque [sc. hbios] donet aim penculo paiabanlur; mox hcmha habendi obhvionem atluhl).
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cially connccted with the language of Acsop, it can be observed espe-
cially on the Roman side, whcre litcrary free spcech is thematized much
more than the practical political aspects of frec speech. In fact, it soon
emerged during the Conference thal the Greek and Roman sources gen-
erally tcndcd to offer decidedly distinct sets of questions: On the Grcek
sidc the issues constantly obtruding themselves concerned the Status of
parrhesia äs a right or otherwise, and the limits of parrhesia (when is it
acceptable, and when not? What contents and contexts does it involve?
Who have it and who don't?). On the Roman side, the practice of veiled
language was emphasized and problematized.
There are even artistic genres, from antiquity to the present, which
seem to depend upon suppression and censorship—or at least the fear
of it—for their vcry existence.42 Satirical writers, for example, tend to
assume that at least some segment of their audience will take offense
at their work, and much of what they write about is inspired by a
paradoxical, pcrhaps even perverse, co-dependcnce on their putative
censors. We will find illustrations of this phenomenon from antiquity
discussed in this collection, but one timely example leaps to mind: only
a few weeks bcforc this Introduction was written, the comedian Lenny
Bruce was officially pardoncd for his violation of American obscenity
laws, nearly forty years after his dcath. Bruce's act, especially in his last
years when he was continually being indicted on obscenity charges,
increasingly thematized his legal skirmishes, to such an extent that
one wonders what would be left for him to satirize if the law ceased
to care about his material. There can be no scandalous discourse
without someone to be scandalized, no call for apologia without an
assumption that one is necessary, whether we are talking about Grcek
comic aischrologia or the 'four-letter words' of Lenny Bruce and his
successors.
5. In this volume ...
In this volume we will encountcr the practice of free speech in differ-
ent (at times intersecting) contexts, political, philosophical, social, liter-
ary, and military. Literary texts include Hesiod, tragcdy, comedy, satire,
Thucydides, Plato, Ovid, Vergil, and Tacitus. Some papers will look at
'- Cf. Rosen and Marks 1999.
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the politics of the concept and try to assign it a place in the history
of concepts and ideas. Its special link with democracy will bc invcs-
tigated, but it will also be studied in connection with aristocracy and
the Roman republic. Its philosophical use by Plato and Aristotle will
be investigated. Some papers focus on the qucstion of who the agents
of free spcech are, and who are excluded. And we will also sce more
lateral approaches, procecding by way of extrapolation from what was
learned from direct observation of the use of the tcrm (äs, e.g. in the
paper by Hanna Roisman, or that by Eric Casey);13 In general, what
will emerge is the great variety of 'practices of free speech', not all
reducible to the same theoretical concept or evaluation of it.
We begin in archaic Greece: Jeremy Mclnerney concentrates on
isegoria and relates this notion of equality in access to speech to the
egalitarian circumstances imposed by the practice of colonization. He
reconstructs the experience of colonization from archaeological evi-
dence and from Homer and Hesiod (e.g. his list of sea nymphs), suggest-
ing that our oldest poetic texts reflect the impact of the colonial experi-
ence on the poetic Imagination (chapter 2). Kurt Raaflaub investigates
notions of (political) equality, liberty and free speech in aristocratic con-
texts, starting in archaic Greece, but then encompassing a sweeping
ränge (Athens, Sparta, Rome); he explains why no counter-concept to
rival democratic Tree speech' was ever developed in such contexts from
the fact that equality within an exclusive group outweighed the notion
of freedom (chapter 3).
In chapter 4, Eric Gasey investigates the language ascribed to the
dead, using funerary inscriptions äs evidence. Although παρρησία is
not explicitly at issue here, the discussion providcs access, on the one
hand, to the voices of women and children, parties excluded from pub-
lic speech in life, and on the other hand, investigates several aspects
of the issue of freedom and constraint of speech not dealt with else-
where. The prematurely dcad, for examplc, are paradoxically depicted
äs having a complete mastery of language, and yet are bcmoaned for
their lack of voice—Casey discusses these and other paradoxes of the
communicating dead at length.
Chapters 5 through 8 dcal with the classical literature of the fifth
Century, Greek drama and historiography. Extrapolating from what we
43
 Cf. Sluitcr and Rosen 2003, 4 for the principle of starting from the lexicon, but
not restricting oneself to placcs where the actual tcrm itself occurs.
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know about free speech, Hanna Roisman (chapter 5) studies women's
frec speech in Greck tragedy, particularly in thc Seven Agmnst Thebes,
Anligone, Agamemnon and the two Electras. She dcmonstrates that women's
public speech may not have bcen universally condemned, but that
a more complex picture emerges particularly where women's speech
scrves äs a vchicle of Opposition to tyranny—in the Service of such a
public cause it may win approval, but it is not supposed to serve äs a
vehicle of personal expression. Even if women's speech may have becn
found disruptivc and subversive in many circumstances, the material
studied suggests that there was also room for other views. In chapter
6, Stephcn Halliwell tackles the issue of comic free speech, and par-
ticularly the notion of αισχρολογία 'shamcful speech', not äs the object
of legislation, but rathcr äs a societal practice. He invcstigates Greek
anxicties about shameful speech with its low-lifc implications, making
use of the evidence of Theophrastus, and then conccntrates on Old
Comedy, where the dynamics of laughter and shamc arc profoundly
changed by the performance setting; finally he addresses the relation-
ship betwcen shameful speech and democratic ideology, pointing at the
uneasy aspccts of παρρησία. Alan Sommerstein provides a meticulous
assessment of all thc evidence about the allegcd attempts to prosecute
Aristophanes with a view to establishing what we can learn about atti-
tudcs among the Athenian public concerning slander in comedy (chap-
ter 7). He concludes that comic satirc was generally rcgarded äs poten-
tially damaging to its targets, and that Aristophanes was at somc timc
charged äs a result of his auctorial activities. Howcver, attempts to seek
legal recourse after comic slander decreascd in frequency in the fifth
Century—it simply did not seem to work: writers of comedy were not to
bc held to a higher Standard of reticencc than anyone eise. In chapter 8,
Emily Greenwood analyses the relationship between spoken and writ-
ten word in Thucydides, and looks cspecially into the role and function
of silencc in the History, suggesting a relationship between Thucydides'
own practice äs a historiographcr, who detcrmines and controls access
to communication with his audiencc, and Pericles controlling thc Athe-
nians, if necessary by thc imposition of silcnce.
Chapters 9 through 12 focus on Athenian democratic ideology and
practice. In a provocative paper, David Carter argues that παρρησία in
the Greck context cannot bc considercd a 'right'; the closest the Athe-
nians come to that concept is in their view of 'freedom'. In the case
of free speech, thc 'right' is not protected, there is no recourse in hav-
ing it takcn away, and its undcrmining is not thought typical of tyrants.
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Rather, παρρησία is an attribute of citizenship, a characteristic form
of self-confident behavior that tcnds ίο accompany it (chapter g). In
chapter 10, Robert Wallacc explores θόρυβος äs a democratic Instru-
ment against the undesirable exercise of 'frce speech': Speakers in the
Assembly could speak freely, but the demos was under no Obligation to
listen. Wallace defcnds the position that this Instrument was used with
discretion. Ryan Balot and Joseph Roisman study the practice of polit-
ical rhetoric. In chapter n, Ryan Balot analyses the conflict between
the perceived benefits and the potential hazards of free speech, and
relatcs it to an emergcnt discourse on civic courage, and its embod-
iment in Athenian public Speakers. The Speakers expressed the bclief
that it is their courage which enables them 'to make a unique contri-
bution to the quintesscntially democratic idcals of deliberation to which
they subscribed'. At the same time, democratic free speech also pro-
duces courage. In chapter 12, Joseph Roisman reconstructs a different
but complementary facet of the democratic relationship between free
speech and courage, by setting out the rolc played by the values and
ideology of masculinity and courage in the power struggles between the
demos and the Speakers. The people held the powcr, viewed thcmselves
äs more moral than the Speaker, and could use the Instrument of thoru-
bos at all timcs. The Speaker strongly projccts the notions of manliness
and courage to justify his free speech.
In chapters 13 and 14, wc turn to philosophy. Mariein van Raaltc
dcmonstrates the special characteristics of 'Socratic' vs. Athenian' par-
rhesia'. a form of parrhesia in which the ruthless search for truth, how-
ever unpleasing, is paramount. This rcquires certain features, a form
of shamclessncss among them, which makes the character of Callicles
in the Gorgias an unexpcctedly suitablc fellow in nonconformist frank-
ness. In the Apology, the unbridgcablc gap between the Socratic practice
of free speech and the wishcs of the polis becomes clear; in the Republic
and Laws the potential political consequences of the Opposition between
Socratic and Athenian parrhesia are thought through (chapter 13). In
chapter 14, John Mulhern refutes the Foucauldian Suggestion that for
Aristotle parrhesia belongs to ethics, but not to politics, by demonstrat-
ing that categorial analysis can bc applied to the Aristotelian notion of
parrhesia throughout his work, and that τα ήίΗκά and τα πολιτικά can be
brought undcr onc System if one takes the point of view of the political
actor, the πολιτικός. Παρρησία in Aristotle is not a virtue, it is a descrip-
tor of a certain type of speech, which is sometimes rightly adopted and
somctimes not.
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The last four chapters take us into the Roman world. Stefan Chris-
santhos demonstratcs in chapter 15 that the notion of libertas and the
concomitant cxercise of free specch played a considcrablc role in the
Roman military. Soldiers had relevant historical and contemporary
political knowlcdge, which they used in communicating with thcir com-
manders. This in turn influenced the way military leadership shaped
its strategy and the conditions of Service. The exercise of free speech by
Roman soldicrs had significant effccts on concrete campaigns. Chapters
16 through 18 concern literary representations of the need for veiled
specch. Victoria Pagän reads the Orpheus story in Ovid against the
disappearance of the praise of Gallus in Vergil's Eclogues, and conjures
up the image of the silenced poet—politician from Orpheus' speech.
She frames her contribution äs an analysis of speaking bcforc superiors
(chapter 16). In chapter 17, Mary McHugh analyses the Tacitean vision
on veiled and figured speech in the speech hc gives to Gremutius Cor-
dus, and particularly in the digression at Ann. 4.32-33, which frames
his narrative of Cremutius Cordus' treason trial. Cremutius Cordus
failcd in his uscd of figured speech, where Tacitus himself succceds.
Susanna Braund studies Roman satire and the somctimes tense rcla-
tionship between libertas and licentia, a striking example of how the
rhctoric of free speech is constructed through a careful choicc of ter-
minology: libertas is always good, and if it refers to free speech, it will
always be the good kind. Licentia implics going further than the norm:
it may refer to a form of free specch that the Speaker does not approvc
of, and it can be threatcning. The threat of licentia, and the way it could
confront the audience with unplcasant truths is always lurking behind
the satirists' use of trieir libertas. And satire's critics will see licentia only.
The editors wish to thank the teams of Classicists at the Universities of
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Trieschnigg, Matthew Bleich, Andrew Fenton, Aislinn Melchior, and
Carl Shaw) and the colleagues who gave cxpert advice on the confer-
encc and the papers, in particularjosine Blök, Joan Booth, Joseph Far-
rell, Manfred Horstmanshoff, Cathy Keane, Sheila Murnaghan, Mar-
tin Ostwald, Mariein van Raalte, Henk Singor, Brent Shaw, and Henk
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